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Abstract
This Article examines a novel separation of powers issue that the
Supreme Court has never directly addressed: the existence and practices
of the United States Marshals. The United States Marshals serve an
executive branch function—law enforcement—yet are often directly
overseen and commanded by the judicial branch. In the United States
federal government system—in which the executive and judicial
branches are designed to act independently—the control the federal
courts exercise over the marshals raises separation of powers concerns.
Since no court has decided what test should apply when federal courts
vicariously exercise executive power, this Article applies several
separation of powers tests to the organizational command structure of
the marshals. These tests derive from unitary executive theory, the
nondelegation doctrine, and the non-Article III adjudication doctrine.
Each of these doctrinal areas involve circumstances where one branch
exercises the power of another. By applying the various Court-created
tests, this Article reveals the common features and parallel results of the
various tests and discusses the broader implications of those
similarities. Despite the different names the Court uses, each test
fundamentally comes down to balancing convenience of governance
against the danger of aggrandizing one of the three branches. It
behooves the Court to consolidate the numerous tests and create a
unified separation of powers doctrine.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The establishment and existence of the United States Marshals
pose separation of powers concerns that have never been directly
addressed by the Supreme Court. The vesting clauses of Articles I, II,
and III of the Constitution vest exclusive and inalienable powers in
each of the three branches of government.1 Yet even though the
1. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983) (“‘[T]he principle of separation of
powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was
woven into the document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787’ . .
. [t]he very structure of the articles delegating and separating powers under Arts. I, II,
and III exemplifies the concept of separation of powers” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976)); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (“The Framers
provided a vigorous Legislative Branch and a separate and wholly independent
Executive Branch, with each branch responsible ultimately to the people. The
Framers also provided for a Judicial Branch equally independent with ‘[t]he judicial
Power . . . extend[ing] to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2) (alteration in
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marshals are primarily law enforcement2 (i.e., executive branch)
officials, they serve at the direction of the judicial branch.3 Despite
this apparent inconsistency, the marshals have existed since the first
Congress,4 and their constitutionality hasn’t been credibly challenged.
Analysis of the separation of power concerns inherent in the marshals
may inform how other government actions could be analyzed.
There are four related doctrinal frameworks which can be used
to analyze the constitutionality of the marshals: unitary executive
theory, the nondelegation doctrine, governmental privatization
doctrine, and administrative adjudication doctrine. Black-letter law
does not call for the application of any of these doctrines to this
specific situation.5 But because there is no ready-made framework for
analyzing the separation of powers issues inherent in the existence of
the marshals, these different doctrinal frameworks are helpful by way
of analogy.
Unitary executive theorists argue that any federal power which
is not judicial or legislative is executive and therefore may be
exercised only by the executive branch.6 Specifically, unitary
executive theory rejects the idea of independent executive agencies or
officers.7 Much of the case law on unitary executive theory focuses on
appointments and removal, while the focus of this Article is on the
original)).
2. See Fact Sheet U.S. Marshals Service 2021, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. (Feb. 26, 2021),
https://www.usmarshals.gov/duties/factsheets/overview.pdf.
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 566(a)–(b) (2015) (“It is the primary role and mission of the
United States Marshals Service . . . to obey, execute, and enforce all orders of the
United States District Courts, the United States Courts of Appeals, the Court of
International Trade, and the United States Tax Court, as provided by law . . . and may,
in the discretion of the respective courts, be required to attend any session of court.”).
4. See An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 27, 1
Stat. 73, 87 (1789) [hereinafter Judiciary Act of 1789].
5. The few times anyone has challenged actions related to the marshals on
separation of powers grounds, courts seem to disregard the argument. See, e.g.,
United States v. Trudell, 563 F.2d 889, 892, 892 n.5 (8th Cir. 1977) (Courts “may
authorize and direct subordinate court officials and marshals to assure that such
required order is observed . . . . Appellant’s contention that the Standing Order, as
enforced by the Deputy United States Marshals, violates the Separation of Powers
doctrine, is clearly without merit.”); Chabal v. Reagan, 841 F.2d 1216, 1222 (3d Cir.
1988) (“Two hundred years of history show that the President's plenary power to
remove marshals from office has not jeopardized the independence and authority of
the courts. Nothing about this case suggests a different conclusion. The separationof-powers doctrine does not shield marshals from removal by the President at will.”).
6. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J., 541, 560 (1994).
7. See id. at 566.
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executive’s directive authority. But, because a President can use the
threat of removal to indirectly achieve directive authority, the
removal power is also discussed.8 Unitary executive theory is
relevant in the marshals context because, to the extent that the
marshals obey the courts rather than the executive, they are executive
officers outside the Executive’s control.
The nondelegation doctrine prohibits the legislative branch from
delegating legislative power to another branch or regulatory agency
without an “intelligible principle” to guide the delegee.9 A few
scholars have long pronounced the doctrine dead law, some have
argued that it is being enforced by indirect means, and yet others
argue that it should be explicitly abandoned by the Court.10
Seemingly, the Supreme Court has only applied the doctrine to
invalidate legislation in two cases, both decided in 1935.11 But, in
recent years, several Supreme Court justices, perhaps enough for a
majority, have indicated a willingness to reassess the Court’s
application of the nondelegation doctrine.12 As a result, some
speculate that the Court may begin to enforce the doctrine more
vigorously and invalidate legislative grants of authority to
8. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2327
(2001).
9. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935).
10. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1723 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI.
L. REV. 315 (2000); Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J. 1003
(2015); West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2619 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(explaining that “the Court routinely enforced ‘the non-delegation doctrine’ through
‘the interpretation of statutory texts, and, more particularly, [by] giving narrow
constructions to statutory delegations.’”).
11. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495; Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935). See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking
down law on commerce clause grounds but in the course of its opinion it expressed
hostility to delegation to nongovernmental actors).
12. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting); Paul v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (the Court denied the
petition for writ of certiorari, and Justice Kavanaugh wrote separately that “Justice
Gorsuch’s scholarly analysis of the Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine in his
Gundy dissent may warrant further consideration in future cases”); see also Dep’t of
Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 575 U.S. 43, 69, 84 (2015); Andrew Coan, Eight Futures
of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2020 WISC. L. REV. 141, 147 (2020); Nicholas, R.
Parillo, A Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case Against Administrative
Regulatory Power: New Evidence from the Federal Tax on Private Real Estate in the
1790s, 130 YALE L.J. 1288, 1294 (2021); Nat’l Fed. Indep. Bus. v. OSHA, 595 U.S. __
(2022) (Gorsuch, J. concurring) (reaffirming the role of the nondelegation doctrine
in ensuring “democratic accountability”).
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administrative agencies.13 This raises the question whether the Court
will reassess other types of delegation, such as to the judiciary.14 An
additional question is whether the Court may be willing to apply the
nondelegation doctrine to address delegations of non-legislative
power.15 This Article, therefore, analyzes how the nondelegation
doctrine might apply to these other types of delegations by examining
a congressional delegation of executive16 authority to the judicial17
branch—the creation of the United States Marshals.
Privatization is the delegation of government functions, usually
executive, to private entities.18 Literature and case law on
privatization posit limits on the government’s ability to privatize.19
For instance, the Supreme Court has held that it is especially
dangerous for Congress to give governmental power to private
parties, and scholars argue that some powers cannot be privatized at
all.20 Although the judiciary is governmental, not private, the
13. See Coan, supra note 12, at 148; Alex Guillén & Paul Demko, How the New
Supreme Court Could Stymie a Biden Presidency, POLITICO, (Sept. 25, 2020 6:32 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/25/supreme-court-regulations-biden421934; Hannah Mullen & Sejal Singh, The Supreme Court Wants to Revive a Doctrine
That Would Paralyze Biden’s Administration, SLATE, (Dec. 1, 2020, 12:56 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/12/supreme-court-gundy-doctrineadministrative-state.html.
14. In the past, the Court has upheld delegations of rulemaking authority to the
courts. See, e.g., Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 23 (1825).
15. By “non-legislative delegations,” I refer to delegations of judicial authority,
such as the creation of administrative law judges, or the delegation of executive
authority such as control of law enforcement officers.
16. Black’s Law Dictionary defines executive thusly: “The branch of government
responsible for effecting and enforcing laws” Executive, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2019). See also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 481 (1789) (“[I]f any power whatsoever is in its
nature executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who
execute the laws.” (quoting James Madison)); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749–
50 (1982) (explaining that “the enforcement of federal law” is a task the President
has “supervisory . . . responsibilit[y]” for pursuant to the Vesting Clause).
17. Black’s Law Dictionary defines judiciary as “[t]he branch of government
responsible for interpreting the laws and administering justice.” Judiciary, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
18. See Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367
(2003); COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT FORECASTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY, GOVERNMENT
PRIVATIZATION:
HISTORY,
EXAMPLES
AND
ISSUES
(2006),
https://cgfa.ilga.gov/Upload/2006Gov_Privatization_Rprt.pdf (“Privatization is the
process of transferring property from public ownership to private ownership and/or
transferring the management of a service or activity from the government to the
private sector.”).
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See Carter v. Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law
Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 424 (2006).
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concept⎯that the President and Congress’s power is
nondelegable⎯is the same.
Thus, the limits on privatizing
government functions parallel and borrow the language of the
nondelegation doctrine.21
The final analytical framework is the doctrine limiting Congress’s
ability to create non-Article III judicial tribunals. The Supreme Court
has articulated limits with regard to what types of tribunals Congress
may create consistent with the Constitution.22 For the sake of clarity,
this Article will call this analysis the “essential attributes” test because
the Court has held that Congress may not deprive the federal courts
of their “essential attributes.”23
This Article does not come to any one conclusion about the
constitutionality of the marshals but, rather, applies the different
frameworks as a thought experiment to show ways the separation of
powers issue could be addressed. Each of these frameworks restricts
the federal government’s ability to re-allocate constitutionally created
powers. This Article hopes to demonstrate, by comparing the
frameworks and their applications to a concrete example, how a
single test for analyzing separation of powers issues may be derived.
Part I of this Article summarizes relevant court decisions and
scholarship about the analytical frameworks for addressing
separation of powers concerns. It also discusses cases about the
marshals. Part II examines the history of the marshals, as well as their
current and historical practices. The aim of Part II is to provide
background showing why the marshals may pose a separation of
powers issue. Part III analyzes the constitutional and practical issues
that stem from the existence of the marshals. Part IV applies the
separation of powers frameworks to the original organization of the
marshals as well as to their current iteration. Part V examines some
of the policy and functional considerations relating to the marshals.
Part VI briefly addresses how the foregoing frameworks might
implicate other separation of powers analyses. Specifically, Part VI
notes the similarity between the different frameworks and suggests
that one underlying test may be derived.

21. See Verkuil, supra note 20, at 421–26; see also Metzger, supra note 18, at
1367; Dina Mishra, An Executive-Power Non-Delegation Doctrine for the Private
Administration of Federal Law, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1509, 1539 (2015).
22. See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511, 546 (1828).
23. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932).
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COURT DECISIONS AND SCHOLARLY WORK
RELATED TO THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

To demonstrate how the various doctrinal frameworks
enumerated above can be applied to the establishment and existence
of the U.S. Marshals, it is first necessary to provide some background
on the various doctrines. Therefore, I provide a brief overview of
court decisions on each doctrine as well as a short summary of
particularly relevant scholarship.
A. Executive Control of Agencies
This Article focuses in part on the President’s directive authority
over executive officials. 24 The case law on directive control is sparse
and the scholarship divided. No Supreme Court case has directly
addressed the President’s power to tell agency officials what to do.
But, at any rate, the most relevant case is Bowsher v. Synar, in which
the Supreme Court held the Comptroller General could not lawfully
exercise executive powers assigned to him by statute because the
Comptroller General was a subordinate of the legislature—rather
than the executive.25
The case law on the amount of control the President can exercise
over the administrative state most often focuses on the President’s
ability to remove and appoint officers. The Court has tended to use
the President’s ability to remove a particular officer as a litmus test
for whether an executive agency is too independent of the executive
and thereby violates the separation of powers.26 Quintessentially, in
Myers v. United States, the Court held that the power to remove
executive branch subordinates is an inherent part of the executive
power, which Article II § 1, of the Constitution vests “in a President of
the United States.”27 By contrast, the Court stated in Humphrey’s

24. Directive or decisional authority is “conceptually and legally distinct” from
the President’s ability to hire and fire. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXTS, AND CASES 148 (8th ed. 2017). Directive authority
relates to “the question of whether the president can tell executive officials what to
do” rather than merely providing oversight. Id.
25. See 478 U.S. 714, 727–33 (1986).
26. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119 (1926); Bowsher, 478 U.S. at
727–33; Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Acct.
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010); Seila Law v. CFPB, 140 S.Ct. 2183, 2191–92
(2020).
27. 272 U.S. 52 passim.
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Executor v. United States that, when an officer is not inherently
executive, Congress can limit the President’s ability to remove (but
only a little).28 The exact contours of when Congress can limit the
president’s removal power seems to be decided ad hoc rather than
through any cross-applicable standard. The best summation may be
that if the President wants to remove an executive officer, Congress
must not make it too difficult for the President to do so.
There are fewer relevant cases in the appointment context, but
the law seems clearer. “[A]ny appointee exercising significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an ‘Officer of the
United States,’ and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner
prescribed by” Article II.29 Congress can “prescrib[e] . . . reasonable
and relevant qualifications and rules of eligibility of appointees” so
long as they do not limit the President’s choices to such an extent that
they “trench” on the executive power.30 Because marshals are officers
of the United States, the removal and appointment precedents apply
to them.
Although Supreme Court precedent is lacking, there are some
lower-court cases addressing the President’s directive authority. For
example, in Building and Construction Trades Department v. Allbaugh,
the District of Columbia Circuit suggested that the Article II vesting
and take care clauses mandate broad presidential power to direct
agency officers.31 Allbaugh relied on another District of Columbia
Circuit case, Sierra Club v. Costle, which stated:
The ordinary duties of officers prescribed by statute
come under the general administrative control of the
President by virtue of the general grant to him of the
executive power, and he may properly supervise and
guide their construction of the statutes under which
they act in order to secure that unitary and uniform
execution of the law which Article II of the
Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting

28. See 295 U.S. 602, 630–32 (1935).
29. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 126 (1976). See also U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2
(“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint . . . Officers of the United States . . . but the Congress may by Law
vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”).
30. Myers, 272 U.S. at 129.
31. See 295 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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general executive power in the President alone.32
Aside from case law, there has been substantial scholarship
devoted to this topic. “The traditional and mainstream position is that
if Congress assigns a task . . . to the head of an agency, the president
cannot dictate the substance of the decision.”33 That view is not
shared by everyone.34 Proponents of unitary executive theory, like
Professor Steven Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes, have argued that the
Constitution vests the President with the power to supplant decisions
of agency officers, even when the statute creating those positions
places policy-making authority solely with the official.35 Presidents
themselves have adopted this interpretation of their own authority.36
In an article by then-professor Elena Kagan, Kagan relates how
various presidents from Regan to Clinton took measures intended to
solidify their directive control of the administrative state.37 Kagan
also argues that even if the Constitution does not give the President
directive power, the threat of removal effectively leads to the same
result.38 Professor Peter Strauss has confirmed that recent presidents
have also attempted to convey that they are responsible for all of the
decisions of the administrative state during their presidency.39
Despite that, Strauss argues that the text of the Constitution is
ambivalent as to whether the President has directive authority.40
B.

Nondelegation and Privatization

The nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from delegating
its lawmaking authority to another branch without an “intelligible
principle” to guide the coordinate branch.41 As explained above, the
Supreme Court has only applied the nondelegation doctrine to
32. 657 F.2d 298, 406 n. 524 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
33. BREYER ET AL., supra note 24, at 149.
34. See, c.f. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1166 (1992).
35. See id.
36. See Kagan, supra note 8, passim.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 2327–28.
39. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 702–04 (2007).
40. See id.
41. See Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935); Gundy v. United States, 139
S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019).
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invalidate two statutes, both times in 1935. In the first case, Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute
which allowed the President to prohibit interstate transportation of
petroleum in specific instances. It did so because the delegation to the
President of that power did not provide clear standards for the
President to follow.42 In the second case, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States,43 the Court declared unconstitutional a statute which
had granted the President the power to approve codes of conduct set
by the poultry industry for itself.44 Again, the Court held that the
statute did not sufficiently direct the President’s discretion when
enforcing the statute.45 The Court has not invalidated a law on
nondelegation grounds since.
Although the Court has only used the doctrine to invalidate a
statute twice, multiple cases, both before and after 1935, have
confronted the doctrine in various ways which are relevant to
analyzing the nondelegation implications for the marshals.
The first case is Wayman v. Southard; there, the Court upheld a
statute authorizing the judiciary to create its own procedural rules.46
Although Wayman was about rulemaking and therefore involved a
legislative delegation, some of Justice Marshall’s statements are
enlightening as to non-legislative delegations as well. Justice Marshall
wrote that “[i]t will not be contended that Congress can delegate to
the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and
exclusively legislative. But Congress may certainly delegate to others,
powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself.”47 So
saying, Justice Marshall implies that it is constitutionally permissible
for Congress to delegate powers which are not legislative, if Congress
can exercise those powers.48 Accordingly, Wayman is the first
instance in which the Court recognized the possibility of nonlegislative delegations.
The Court has also held that the extent to which or wisdom with
which a delegee uses their delegated power is irrelevant to the
nondelegation analysis.
In Whitman v. American Trucking
Associations, Inc., Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that an
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See 293 U.S. at 415.
See 295 U.S. at 495.
See id. at 541–42.
See id.
See 23 U.S. 1, 50 (1825).
Id. at 42–43.
See id.
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agency cannot itself cure a nondelegation problem by construing a
statute narrowly.49 This implies that if a statute grants federal courts
broad powers over the marshals, the fact that the courts use those
powers sparingly will not ameliorate any nondelegation problems
inherent in the statute.
The Court has held that instances in which coordinate branches
assist each other to carry out their legitimate duties should not be
considered delegations. In Gundy v. United States Justice Kagan,
writing for a plurality of the Court, applied the intelligible principle
test while affirming that “[c]ongress may ‘obtain[ ] the assistance of
its coordinate Branches’—and in particular, may confer substantial
discretion on executive agencies to implement and enforce the
laws.”50 The assistance principle could apply to non-legislative
delegations as well, since they can also be characterized as assistance.
Because privatization cases use the same language and concepts
as the nondelegation cases, both doctrines are discussed here.51 In
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., the Court addressed whether Congress could,
consistent with the Constitution, delegate the power to set minimum
wages for coal workers to non-governmental groups.52 Although the
Court ultimately invalidated the law as beyond the scope of Congress’s
Commerce Clause power, the Court stated, “[t]his is legislative
delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to
an official or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to
private persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the
interests of others in the same business.”53
More recently the Court decided Department of Transportation v.

49. See 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (“The idea that an agency can cure an
unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of
that power seems to us internally contradictory. The very choice of which portion of
the power to exercise–that is to say, the prescription of the standard that Congress
had omitted–would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority.”
(emphasis in original)).
50. 139 S.Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (citing Misretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
372 (1989)).
51. Compare the language and reasoning in Carter Coal Co. v. Carter, 298 U.S.
238 (1936), with that of Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415 (1935). See also
Calvin R. Massey, The Non-Delegation Doctrine and Private Parties, 17 GREEN BAG 2D
157, 167 (2014), http://www.greenbag.org/vT7n2/V'7n2_ariclesCmassy.pdf
(“Delegation to private entities is a mirror image of the usual nondelegation
concern.”).
52. See 298 U.S. at 311.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
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Association of American Railroads.54 Before the Supreme Court
granted certiorari, the D.C. Circuit held that—for purposes of the
dispute—Amtrak was a private entity and that Congress had violated
the nondelegation doctrine when it granted “Amtrak and the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA) joint authority to issue ‘metrics and
standards’ that address the performance and scheduling of passenger
railroad services.”55 The Circuit reasoned that because Amtrak was a
private party, Congress could not delegate rulemaking authority to
it.56
The Supreme Court ultimately held that Amtrak was
governmental rather than private.57 The Court then remanded the
case to the Circuit to determine whether Congress’s grant nonetheless
violated the nondelegation doctrine.58 Hence, it is evident that cases
invalidating privatization rely on the same reasoning as the
nondelegation doctrine.
The literature on privatization provides a helpful framework to
understand the marshals because it has been applied specifically to
delegations of executive power.59 Although this doctrine is not
dispositive given the differences between private actors and the
judicial branch, the concepts remain useful in building a framework
to analyze the marshals. Privatization scholarship argues that the
Constitution limits the government’s ability to delegate the power to
perform certain inherently governmental activities to private
parties.60 Paul Verkuil has theorized that “certain government
functions may be so fundamental as not to be transferable to private
hands under any circumstances. Acts of government committed to
high officials, including the President, who have taken oaths to uphold
the Constitution fall into this category.”61 Verkuil ties this limitation
to both the textual requirement that certain officials take an oath to
defend the Constitution as well to the desirability that those in

54. See 575 U.S. 43 (2015)
55. Id. at 45.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 55–56.
59. See Mishra, supra note 21, at 1509.
60. See, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 20, at 425, 438; Mishra, supra note 21, at 1509;
but see Jody Freeman, The Private Role in the Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
582 (2000) (asserting that in a privatization case, West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1998),
the Supreme Court was unperturbed by privatization and that “the Court never
engaged the possibility that some duties might be nondelegable.”).
61. Verkuil, supra note 20, at 424.
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government be accountable for their enumerated duties.62
Relatedly, in an article by Dina Mishra, Mishra focuses on the
language of the Vesting Clause, Take Care Clause, and Appointments
Clause in determining the scope of the President’s authority to
delegate executive power to private entities.63 The framework that
Mishra proposes first asks whether a specific power is “executive” and
second whether the entity delegated to is subordinate enough to the
President such that the President retains ultimate control of that
power.64 Mishra’s “Article conceptualizes [the executive] power as an
authority to ‘take Care’ and bear ultimate responsibility for the
execution of law, rather than to execute it directly, the President might
retain that power so long as he retains some ability to take meaningful
steps to encourage the faithful execution of law.”65 Although her
article focuses on delegations of executive power by the executive
branch, Mishra notes that her analysis:
rests on the principle of non-divestment of “[t]he
executive Power” from the President. Where Congress
purports to authorize someone to perform certain
tasks fundamental to the execution of law, under this
doctrine’s logic Congress cannot divest the President
of all influence or control, whether directly or through
his subordinates, over that task or the one performing
it.66
Thus, we can apply Mishra’s analysis where, as here, Congress
delegates executive power to the Judiciary. Mishra concludes that
there are certain bounds placed upon the President’s ability to
privatize executive branch functions.67
In an inverse of the issue presented by the marshals, an article by
Mark Thomson argues that the intelligible principle test should be
62. Id. at 425. Be that as it may, nowhere does the Constitution address whether
any specific power is delegable.
63. See Mishra, supra note 21, at 1523.
64. See id. at 1524.
65. Id. at 1541. Mishra also recognizes that evidence exists which tends to show
that arrests have historically not been considered exclusively executive; see also id. at
1548 (“Ultimately, the best, albeit imperfect, explanation for private citizens’
authority to conduct arrests regardless of executive control may be that an arrest is
attenuated from the ultimate administration of a sanction for the violation of law.”).
66. Id. at 1524.
67. See id.
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applied to situations in which the judicial branch delegates judicial
responsibility to probation officers.68 When judges direct the
marshals, they, arguably, indirectly exercise the executive power. By
contrast, according to Thomson’s article, when probation officers
(who are executive officials) do their job, they exercise the judicial
power. Thomson observes that, as a textual matter, “[t]he Vesting
Clauses that give rise to both Article I’s and Article III’s nondelegation
principles are virtually identical—using basically the same language
and having basically the same structure.”69 But despite the textual
similarity between the vesting clauses in Articles I and III, courts look
to whether non-Article III judges are exercising the “essential
attributes” of the judicial branch when assessing whether a delegation
violates the separation of powers rather than looking for an
“intelligible principle.”70 This brings us to the next separation of
powers test.
C. Administrative Adjudication
Cases involving Congress’s assignment of judicial functions to
administrative agencies should also be considered nondelegation
cases. In essence, those cases involve the extent to which Congress
may delegate judicial power to non-Article III courts. Thus, the
Court’s analysis in those cases sheds light on ways to analyze other
non-legislative delegations.
The first case to address this issue did so only briefly. In
American Insurance Company v. Canter, Chief Justice John Marshall
writing for the Court, assessed the constitutionality of the admiralty
jurisdiction of the territorial court of Florida, the judges of which were
limited to a four-year term in office.71 Justice Marshall wrote, “[t]hese
courts, then, are not Constitutional Courts, in which the judicial
powers conferred by the Constitution on the general government can
be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it.”72 Canter expressly
recognizes that the core “judicial [p]ower” cannot be delegated
outside the courts created under Article III. It is, therefore, a

68. See Mark Thomson, Who Are They to Judge?: The Constitutionality of
Delegations by Courts to Probation Officers, 96 MINN. L. REV. 306, 329 (2011).
69. Id. at 328.
70. Id. at 310.
71. See 26 U.S. 511, 512 (1828) (“deposit[ing]” judicial power mirrors the idea
of “delegating” legislative power).
72. Id.
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quintessential example of a case analyzing Congress’s power to
delegate non-legislative power.73
Later cases somewhat complicated this area of law.74 The Court
has struggled to articulate exactly when Congress may vest nonArticle III tribunals with the power to adjudicate cases. Congress may
usually vest a non-Article III tribunal with adjudicatory power in two
situations: first, Congress may require cases involving “public
rights”—rights created by Congress—to be adjudicated by nonArticle III courts75; second, Congress may require that rights which
are not “public” be adjudicated by non-Article III courts so long as
doing so does not infringe on the “essential attributes” of Article III
courts.76
D. Case Law on the Character of the Marshals
This Article focuses on Congress’s ability to transfer power from
the executive branch to the judiciary. But to determine whether the
marshals constitute a delegation of executive power to the judiciary,
we must first determine whether the marshals are executive. In
Cunningham v. Neagle, the Supreme Court assumed, without in-depth
analysis, that the marshals were an executive agency.77 The Court

73. Ultimately, Justice Marshall upheld the jurisdiction of the territorial courts
on the theory that the federal government has special powers when legislating for the
territories, which Florida was at the time. See id. (“In legislating for [the territories],
Congress exercises the combined powers of the general and state governments.”)
74. See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284
(1855) (holding that in cases of public rights, “Congress may or may not bring within
the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper.”); Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50–51, 60 (1932) (non-Article III courts can decide cases
involving private rights so long as there is adequate judicial review in an Article III
court because this maintains the essential attributes of Article III review); N. Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982) (reasserting the
importance of the public versus private rights distinction); Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) (creating multi-factor balancing
test to determine whether a non-Article III court can adjudicate a private right
common law claim); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 490 (2011) (Court limited the
public rights doctrine to “federal regulatory scheme[s]” or claims where “an expert
Government agency is deemed essential to a limited regulatory objective”); Oil States
Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S.Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018) (“[The]
Court has not ‘definitively explained’ the distinction between public and private
rights, and its precedents applying the public-rights doctrine have 'not been entirely
consistent.’”).
75. See Crowell, 285 U.S at 50–51.
76. See id. at 51; see also N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 77.
77. 135 U.S. 1, 60–63 (1890).
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provided examples of the “executive power” and included control
over the marshals as one example; the critical issue being whether the
federal government could enforce the laws it enacted or if it had to
rely on state enforcement agencies to enforce federal law.78 The issue
arose when a deputy marshal shot and killed a man who had tried to
assault a Supreme Court Justice. Writing for the Court, Justice Miller
rhetorically asked:
Why do we have marshals at all, if they cannot
physically lay their hands on persons and things in the
performance of their proper duties? What functions
can they perform, if they cannot use force? In
executing the process of the courts, must they call on
the nearest constable for protection? Must they rely
on him to use the requisite compulsion, and to keep
the peace, whilst they are soliciting and entreating the
parties and by-standers to allow the law to take its
course?79
The Court then rhetorically asks where the judicial branch is to turn
for its own protection, and, in response, the Court states that they turn
to the marshals for protection—and assumes that the marshals
belong to the executive branch:
[A]s has been more than once said in this court, in the
division of the powers of government between the
three great departments, executive, legislative, and
judicial, the judicial is the weakest for the purposes of
self-protection, and for the enforcement of the powers
which it exercises. The ministerial officers through
whom its commands must be executed are marshals of
the United States, and belong emphatically to the
executive department of the government. They are
appointed by the president, with the advice and
consent of the senate. They are removable from office
at his pleasure. They are subjected by act of congress
to the supervision and control of the department of
justice, in the hands of one of the cabinet officers of the
president, and their compensation is provided by acts
78. See id.
79. Id. at 61.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol42/iss2/3

16

338

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 42.2

of congress . . . . We cannot doubt the power of the
president to take measures for the protection of a
judge of one of the courts of the United States who,
while in the discharge of the duties of his office, is
threatened with a personal attack which may
probably result in his death; and we think it clear that
where this protection is to be afforded through the
civil power, the department of justice is the proper one
to set in motion the necessary means of protection.80
For those reasons, the Court held that the marshals were
executive in nature. There are two weaknesses in Justice Miller’s
opinion. First, it fails to account for the history of the marshals and
the possibility that the marshals are, in fact, part of the judicial branch.
Second, if the marshals are executive, as Justice Miller asserts, it begs
the question whether the delegation of supervisory authority to the
United States courts violates the nondelegation doctrine— i.e., the
subject of this Article.
Contrarily, at least one past Supreme Court Justice has stated
that. since the founding, the marshals have been integral to the judicial
branch and that their history establishes that judges have broad
authority to direct the marshals.81 In Pennsylvania Bureau of
Correction v. U.S. Marshals, Justice Stevens, dissenting, noted that
“[t]he court’s authority to issue such directives to the marshal is
therefore not derived from the All Writs Act, but rather is simply one
of the powers of the federal judicial office that has long been an aspect
of the relationship between the court and its officers.”82 Although
Justice Stevens does not explicitly reference the “judicial [p]ower” of
Article III, his reference to the “powers of the federal judicial office”
evokes that power, implying his belief that direction of the marshals
is within the Court’s inherent constitutional powers. Chief Justice
Burger’s dissent in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services is also
informative.83 Nixon revolved around the constitutionality of a federal
statute which directs the General Services Administration to preserve
presidential materials. The Court held that the statute was
constitutional, but, in his dissent, Chief Justice Burger implied that the
80. Id. at 63–67 (emphasis added).
81. See Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals, 474 U.S. 34, 45–47 (1985) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 48.
83. See 433 U.S. 425, 505 (1977).
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Court was interpreting its precedent to mean that the “Judiciary is at
liberty to order all papers of a President into custody of United States
Marshals.”84
Finally, some lower courts have also found that the judiciary has
broad power to direct marshals and that such direction does not
violate any separation of powers principle.85
As explained further below, the history of the marshals makes it
far from clear whether the marshals were thought of as part of the
executive branch by the Founders. But depending on the answer, the
marshals’ subordination to the judiciary could violate the separation
of powers principle inherent in the Constitution.
E. Other Scholarship on the Separation of Powers
Professor Gerard Bradley has written about the separation of
powers implications when officers who are not under the complete
control of the executive branch undertake executive functions.86
Bradley’s article contradicts some of the foundational assertions in
Mishra’s analysis. For instance, Bradley asserts that much of what is
characterized as executive should not be characterized that way.87 He
contends instead that “[l]aw enforcement is a governmental activity
dispersed across the branches with effective congressional
direction.”88 If that is true, the vesting clause of Article II does not limit
the President or Congress’s authority to delegate enforcement power
because enforcement is a power shared among all the branches, not
just one. Even if Bradley is correct, this argument may only hold up
for delegations of “executive” power and may not apply to other types

84. Id. at 516. To be clear, Chief Justice Burger disagreed with this proposition
and was admonishing the majority justices for misreading the Court’s precedent. But
his implication that the majority was holding that judges could direct the marshals to
go against the President’s directives is significant if an accurate characterization.
85. See United States v. Trudell, 563 F.2d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 1977) (“The inherent
power of a judge to require order in and around the courtroom, including the
immediately adjacent areas, is fundamental to the administration of justice . . . To that
end he may authorize and direct subordinate court officials and marshals to assure
that such required order is observed.” (citation omitted)); id. at n.5 (“Appellant’s
contention that the Standing Order, as enforced by the Deputy United States Marshals,
violates the Separation of Powers doctrine, is clearly without merit.”).
86. See Gerard V. Bradley, Law Enforcement and the Separation of Powers, 30
ARIZ. L. REV. 801 (1988).
87. See id. at 804 (“Law enforcement just is not a peculiarly article II activity
requiring presidential direction.”).
88. Id.
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of non-legislative delegation such as of “judicial” power.
Relatedly, one recent article by Professors Julian Davis
Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley altogether “refutes the claim that the
Constitution was originally understood to contain a nondelegation
doctrine.”89 They base their argument on the fact that “early federal
Congresses adopted dozens of laws that broadly empowered
executive and judicial actors to adopt binding rules of conduct for
private parties on some of the most consequential policy questions of
the era, with little if any guidance to direct them.”90 Their analysis is
relevant here because similar reasoning may apply to the marshals—
who were created by the First Congress. Yet the analysis conducted
by Mortenson and Bagley is not dispositive on the constitutionality of
non-legislative delegations because even if delegations of
administrative rulemaking power were routine, the delegation of law
enforcement power may have its own distinct separation of powers
concerns. Professor Ilan Wurman’s response to the article by
Mortenson and Bagley is also relevant to the analysis here.91 Wurman
accepts that the Founders thought certain powers were nonexclusive,
meaning that they could be characterized as either legislative or
executive, but rejects the proposition that all powers were thought of
as nonexclusive.92
Wurman therefore contends that the
nondelegation doctrine did exist and—as relevant to this Article—his
argument provides support for the idea that even if some powers
were thought of as nonexclusive at the founding, the power over law
enforcement may not have been.
Another recent article by Nicholas Parillo provides new
originalist evidence tending to show that the Founders did not believe
in a nondelegation doctrine. Parillo examined “the rulemaking power
[of the federal board of tax commissioners]” under the “direct tax” of
179893 and found that the federal board of tax commissioners were
given authority to make regulations that were “coercive and
domestic” and “that the originalist skeptics of rulemaking are
mistaken” in arguing that such delegations did not occur.94 Like
89. Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 277 (2021).
90. Id.
91. See Ilan Wurman, No Nondelegation at the Founding? Not So fast, Notice &
Comment, YALE J. ON REG. (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/nonondelegation-at-the-founding-not-so-fast-by-ilan-wurman/.
92. See id.
93. Parillo, supra note 12, at 1302.
94. Id.
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Parillo’s 1798 tax commissioners, the marshals long existence also
unsettles the conventional wisdom on nondelegation. The fact that
the Founders authorized the existence of the tax commissioners and
the marshals lends credence to the argument that delegation of the
various branches’ powers was not considered constitutionally
prohibited by the Founders. After all, marshals have been around for
nearly as long as the Constitution itself.95
III.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES MARSHALS AND CURRENT
PRACTICE

The United States Marshals are the oldest federal law
enforcement agency.96 They were established by the Judiciary Act of
1789, signed into law by President Washington on September 24,
1789.97 The same Act established the three levels of federal courts,
delineated their jurisdiction, and concurrently established the
marshals to serve at the direction of the judiciary.98
The legislative history of the Judiciary Act reveals that certain
members of Congress saw marshals as essential to the functioning of
the federal judiciary. For example, in a floor speech on August 24,
1789, Representative Samuel Livermore criticized the proposed
Judiciary Act for the expense of requiring an additional set of judges
and marshals⎯thus assuming that both were required when
establishing new federal courts.99 Representative William Loughton
95. See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 27.
96. See FREDERICK S. CALHOUN, THE LAWMEN: UNITED STATES MARSHALS AND THEIR
DEPUTIES: 1789–1989 2 (Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989).
97. See Judiciary Act of 1789; see also MAEVA MARCUS, ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, 4 (1992).
98. See MARCUS, supra note 97, at 4; Judiciary Act of 1789 § 27 (“And be it further
enacted, [t]hat a marshal shall be appointed in and for each district for the term of
four years, but shall be removable from office at pleasure, whose duty it shall be to
attend the district and circuit courts when sitting therein, and also the Supreme Court
in the District in which that court shall sit. [ ] And to execute throughout the district,
all lawful precepts directed to him, and issued under the authority of the United States,
and he shall have power to command all necessary assistance in the execution of his
duty, and to appoint as there shall be occasion, one or more deputies, [ ] who shall be
removable from office by the judge of the district court, or the circuit court sitting within
the district, at the pleasure of either.”) (emphasis added).
99. Judiciary Act of 1789. It is noteworthy that Samuel Livermore served as the
head of the New Hampshire Superior Court of Judicature before becoming a Member
of Congress—demonstrating his familiarity with court functions. See Livermore,
Samuel,
BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
CONGRESS,
https://bioguideretro.congress.gov/Home/MemberDetails?memIndex=L000364
(last visited Jan. 22, 2021).
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Smith, responding to Livermore’s criticism, likewise presumed that
establishing courts would require both judges and marshals.100
This assumption makes sense given the traditional role of court
officers. Like many lawyers of the time, Representative William
Loughton Smith studied the law of England.101 Because it provided
the background for how the Founders thought of judicial procedure,
the English courts’ procedural precedent was important to the way
the drafters of the Judiciary Act thought of the necessary powers of a
court.102 In the English system the “Sheriff [was] the immediate
officer to all the Courts at Westminster to execute writs . . . .” 103 The
English sheriff would sometimes even sit with the judges on the
bench.104 The sheriff was also a common concept in the American
colonies. “Prior to independence, each of the American colonies had
established a system of local courts served by sheriffs appointed by
the royal governor (except in Pennsylvania, where sheriffs were
elected).”105 And, after the founding, marshals were sometimes called
“Federal Sheriffs.”106
Another inspiration for the marshals came from the British and
colonial-American vice-admiralty courts.107 Part of the structure of
those courts included officers—called marshals—who “served the
writs, subpoenas, and other court process, took possession of
condemned ships and goods, made arrests, kept custody of the court’s
100. Judiciary Act of 1789.
101. Smith, William Loughton, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS,
https://bioguideretro.congress.gov/Home/MemberDetails?memIndex=S000633
(last visited Jan. 22, 2021); English common law and court practice formed the basic
framework for the colonial judiciary. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787 10 (1989). English Jurist William Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of Englander were referenced in the ratification debates.
3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, 544
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836).
102. See generally Emile J. Katz, Note, The “Judicial Power” and Contempt of
Court, 109 CAL. L. REV. 1913, 1925 (2021) (explaining how the founders looked to the
English judicial system for guidance).
103. GEORGE ATKINSON, SHERIFF-LAW; OR, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE OFFICE OF
SHERIFF, UNDERSHERIFF, BAILIFFS, ETC.: THEIR DUTIES AT THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF
PARLIAMENT AND CORONERS, ASSIZES, AND SESSIONS OF THE PEACE, 5 (4th ed. 1861).
104. See id. at 6.
105. U.S. Marshals Service, History: Recognition of the Need for Federal Marshals,
https://www.usmarshals.gov/history/judiciary/judiary_act_of_1789_6.htm
(last
visited Feb. 16, 2022).
106. Id.
107. See CALHOUN, supra note 96, at 13.
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prisoners, hung convicted pirates and murderers, and carried out all
the orders of the courts.”108 When the First Congress created the
judicial system they modeled it on the admiralty courts, including
marshals to enforce judicial commands.109 Yet, those during the era
knew they were creating a new system—distinct from England or the
colonies—and that, as such, judges might not need the same
attendants they had at common law.110 The role of the marshal may
therefore have been considered vestigial: relating to the powers of the
judiciary under the English system where judges themselves were
officers of the executive.
There is some debate about the extent to which the marshals
were judicial branch officers. In her article, discussed above, Dina
Mishra assumes that a federal law enforcement agency like the
marshals has always been considered executive.111 To support this,
Mishra points to the fact that the marshals were removable by the
executive.112 However, the boundary between executive and judicial
branches has not always been clear. For example, prosecutors—now
considered executive—were once considered judicial officials.113
With the marshals, the distinction is even more muddled. Although
the President had authority to remove a marshal, the courts could
remove deputy marshals.114 And the first Congress’s decision to vest
in the judiciary the power to remove deputy marshals likely gave the
judiciary significant control over the marshals as a whole. Further,
the Judiciary Act mandated that the marshals follow judicial orders. It
required marshals and deputy marshals take the following oath of
office: “I, A. B., do solemnly swear or affirm, that I will faithfully

108. Id.
109. See id. at 13–14.
110. See generally Katz, supra note 102, at 1932–34 (explaining how the
founders intentionally departed from the English system to separate the judicial and
executive branches).
111. See Mishra, supra note 21, at 1546 n.164.
112. See id.
113. See Joan E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor in Historical Context (2010),
available
at
https://cdn.ymaws.com/mcaamn.org/resource/resmgr/Files/About_Us/AmerProsecutorHistoricalCont.pdf?mscl
kid=b5fdd600ac6d11ec8b9512b7ff4c673f (“As a subsidiary of the courts, the
prosecutor was considered an adjunct to the real powers of the courts, the judges.”).
114. While the marshals have historically been appointed and removable by the
President, Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 60–63 (1890), the text of the Judiciary
Act does not actually specify which of the branches was to appoint or remove the
marshals. Read in context, the most logical branch to do so may have actually been
the Judiciary. See Judiciary Act of 1789.
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execute all lawful precepts directed to the marshal of the district of
under the authority of the United States . . . .”115 The language
“authority of the United States” was intentionally chosen over other
language that would have placed the marshals under the exclusive
command of the President: One prominent Federalist, Oliver
Ellsworth, specifically proposed that the Judiciary Act should place
the marshals under the President’s authority, but that proposal was
rejected.116 And one reason that the Anti-Federalists were not overly
concerned about the marshals was that the marshals were thought to
only have the power to enforce court orders and federal law.117
Over time, the marshals’ command structure was slightly
modified. “In 1849 the Congress [] vested the Secretary of the Interior
with ‘supervisory power’ over marshals’ census taking operations and
their financial accounts.”118 In 1861, a statute placed the marshals
(and U.S. Attorneys) under the “general superintendence and
direction” of the Attorney General.119 But the legislative history,
though admittedly somewhat inconclusive, suggests that the Act was
merely intended to transfer the limited supervisory powers of the
Secretary of the Interior to the Attorney General.120 Additionally, the
1861 Act did not strip the courts of their own authority over the
marshals—granted in 1789121; the Act “placed marshals under the
‘general superintendence and direction’ of the Attorney General and
left unchanged the original requirement that marshals attend sessions
of court and execute writs, process etc., when directed by the
judiciary.”122
Even if the marshals were nominally housed under the executive
branch, they were largely autonomous, independent of executive
115. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 27. It is also worth noting that the marshals
traditionally paid the fees of the U.S. Attorneys. And because the marshals worked at
the close direction of Judges one might infer that the Judges had significant influence
over the U.S. Attorneys as well. See also CALHOUN, supra note 96, at 6.
116. See U.S. Marshals Service, History: Recognition of the Need for Federal
Marshals,
https://www.usmarshals.gov/history/judiciary/judiary_act_of_1789_7.htm
(last
visited Feb. 16, 2022).
117. See id.
118. Report by the Comptroller General, U.S. Marshals’ Dilemma: Serving Two
Branches of Government 8 (1982) [hereinafter Comptroller General].
119. See Act of August 2, 1861, ch. 37, 12 Stat. 285 (1861); Comptroller General
supra note 118, at 7–8.
120. See Comptroller General, supra note 118, at 8–9.
121. Id. at 6–8.
122. Id. at 6.
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control, and only beholden to the judge in their district.123
For most of their history, U.S. Marshals enjoyed a
surprising degree of independence in performing
their duties. Quite simply, no headquarters or central
administration existed to supervise the work of the
Marshals until the late 1950s. Even then, the Executive
Office for U.S. Marshals had no real power over the
districts until it was transformed into the U.S.
Marshals Service in 1969 and given control of the
district budgets and the hiring of Deputies. Prior to
that, each Marshal was practically autonomous,
receiving only general guidance from the executive
branch of the government. As a result[,] the
Marshals[,] working with the federal judges and U.S.
Attorneys in their districts, enjoyed a wide latitude in
determining how they would enforce the law.124
There is evidence from the mid-1800’s of the judicial branch
using the marshals to enforce their orders against explicitly executive
branch officials. For instance, in 1861 at the start of the United States
Civil War, Chief Justice Taney directed a marshal to summon a posse
comitatus to seize Union General George Cadwalader and bring him
to the Court.125 Chief Justice Taney eventually excused the marshal
from performing his orders because that General Cadwalader’s
military force was much greater than any force the marshal could
summon, but, nonetheless, this use of the marshals shows the level of
control the judiciary exercised over them—even against the executive
branch. The early history of the marshals exemplifies how the
marshals would not necessarily have been considered solely
executive by contemporary lawmakers.
A more significant reorganization occurred in the 1960s. In
1966, the U.S. Marshals Service was reorganized in a bill which
codified “the general and permanent laws relating to the organization
123. See id. at 1.
124. CALHOUN, supra note 96, at 6.
125. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F.Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). The military has
been considered a part of the executive branch since 1789. See also The Establishment
of the Department of War, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (June
30, 2021),
https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1700s/The-establishment-of-theDepartment-of-War/.
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of the Government of the United States.”126 Prior to that statute, the
marshals served in essentially the same way from 1789 until the late
1950s with limited oversight from Washington.127 Upon a vacancy in
the office of U.S. Marshal, the 1966 statute provided that “[t]he district
court for a district in which the office of United States marshal is
vacant may appoint a United States marshal to serve until the vacancy
is filled.”128 In 1969 the Attorney General established the Marshals
Service by DOJ Order 415–69, May 12, 1969.129
The statute which reorganized the marshals has been amended
since 1966.130 The modern statute, under which the marshals derive
their authority, gives the marshals two “masters”; they serve under
the direction of the United States Attorney General and yet are
required to obey and execute the orders of the judges they serve.131
Furthermore, the marshals describe themselves as the “enforcement
arm of the federal courts.”132
The issues stemming from the dual authorities that oversee the
marshals are not merely a scholastic or hypothetical matter. In 1979,
Senator Max Baucus asked the General Accounting Office to “review
various functions performed by U.S. Marshals.”133 Specifically, the
report “concerns the organizational relationship of U.S. Marshals to
126. Title 5 Government Organization and Employees, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80
Stat. 378 (1966) [hereinafter Government Organization and Employees].
127. See CALHOUN, supra note 96, at 6.
128. Government Organization and Employees, supra note 126, at 620
(emphasis added).
129. See National Archives, Records of the U.S. Marshals Service, 527.1
ADMINISTRATIVE
HISTORY,
(last
visited
Feb.
2,
2022
3:09
PM),
https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/527.html#527.1.
130. See 28 U.S.C. § 561 (2006).
131. See id. § 561(a) (“There is hereby established a United States Marshals
Service as a bureau within the Department of Justice under the authority and
direction of the Attorney General.”); 28 U.S.C. § 566(a) (2021) (“It is the primary role
and mission of the United States Marshals Service to provide for the security and to
obey, execute, and enforce all orders of the United States District Courts, the United
States Courts of Appeals, the Court of International Trade, and the United States Tax
Court, as provided by law.”). It has been recognized for thousands of years that “no
one can serve two masters.” Matthew 6:24; Luke 16:13.
132. U.S. Marshals Service, Fact Sheet U.S. Marshals 2021, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. OFF.
OF
PUB.
AFFS.
(Feb.
26,
2021),
https://www.usmarshals.gov/duties/factsheets/overview.pdf; see also U.S. Marshals
Service, Fact Sheet Judicial Security 2020, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. OFF. OF PUB. AFFS. (Feb. 26,
2021), https://www.usmarshals.gov/duties/factsheets/judicial_sec.pdf (“The U.S.
Marshals Service has been responsible for protecting the federal judicial process as
the enforcement arm of the federal courts since 1789.”).
133. Comptroller General, supra note 118, at i.
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the Federal judiciary and the Department of Justice, and how this
relationship affects the performance of duties and responsibilities
assigned to marshals by both branches of the Government.”134 The
report concluded that “[t]he manner in which the existing
organizational relationship has been implemented [ ] prevents the
U.S. Marshals Service from effectively managing law enforcement
programs assigned by the Attorney General, and –[ ]interferes with
the marshals’ performance of essential duties for the Federal courts
which hinders the judicial process.”135 The GAO proposed that if the
Attorney General and Judiciary could not resolve the difficulties
administratively, “that the Congress take legislative action to
eliminate the Attorney General’s authority to supervise, direct, and
control the operations of U.S. marshals.”136 A majority of Chief Circuit
Judges agreed with the proposition that reforms needed to be made.
The Department of Justice on the other hand, took the position “that
dual authority is an illusory concept . . . [and] that authority to
supervise and direct marshals is clearly and exclusively vested in the
Attorney General . . .”137 The GAO contended that dual authority was
not illusory.138 Although Congress never reformed the marshals as
suggested by the GAO, the potentiality raises the question whether
following the GAO’s suggestion would violate the separation of
powers.
Even though the Department of Justice claimed that there wasn’t
dual authority, it implicitly recognized that it did not have full
authority over the marshals when the agency supported legislation
which would have given them sole control over determining the
security needs of the United States Courts.139 Additionally, the
Attorney General has effectively conceded that the marshals could be
commanded by court order⎯even those orders contrary to the
direction of the Marshals Service.140 The Marshals Service has been
forced to accept that the marshals, as court officers, can be
commanded by the courts—which has hindered the Marshals Service

134. Id. at 1.
135. Id. at cover page.
136. See id. at iv.
137. Id.
138. See id. at v.
139. See id. at 11 (the legislation was not adopted).
140. See id. Note that the United States Marshals and the United States Marshals
Service are not synonymous. Id. at 10, 16. The service has far more control over
Deputy Marshals than it does over marshals themselves.
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from “exercising fundamental management prerogatives.”141
The current statute under which the marshals operate gives the
Attorney General and the Marshals Service somewhat more control
over the marshals. For instance, under 28 U.S.C. § 562, when there is
a vacancy in the office of a U.S. Marshal, the Attorney General
temporarily appoints someone to the office, rather than the district
court of the district.142 Yet the changes in statutory text are not
significant enough to fix the issues identified by the GAO.143 The
author of this Article submitted a Freedom of Information Act request
to the United States Marshals Service which, among other things,
requested any “[d]ocuments relating to the Marshals’ procedures in
situations where a court order/warrant conflicts with a directive of
the Director of the Marshals Service or Attorney General.”144 In
response, the United States Marshals Service informed the author that
“USMS conducted a search of its records and files within the Prisoner
Operations Division, the Judicial Security Division, and the
Investigative Operations Division, which all failed to locate any USMS
records responsive to your request.”145 As such, it appears that the
Department of Justice has not published any policy guidance
explaining to the marshals how to deal with the situations that the
GAO identified: those in which directives of the courts and the Justice
Department conflict.
The failure to clarify who has authority to direct the marshals has
had practical consequences. On June 29, 2021, United States District
Court Judge Charles Kornmann, filed an order appointing a special
prosecutor to prosecute three employees of the Marshal’s Service for

141. Id. at 15. For example, one of the top priorities of the Marshals Service is
the Witness Security Program, yet many marshals view the program as low-priority
and the Marshals Service cannot always adequately direct the marshals because the
marshals can be commanded by the district court. Id. at 16–17.
142. See 28 U.S.C. § 562.
143. A recent report by the Justice Department’s Inspector General’s office
found that “‘competing agency priorities have impeded’ the Marshals Service’s ability
to fund enhancements to security.” Dan Mangan, U.S. Marshals Service Lacks
Resources to Protect Federal Judges Even as Threats Surge 81%, Report Says, CNBC
(June 16, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/16/us-marshals-lack-resourcesto-protect-federal-judges-as-threats-surge-report-says.html; see also DEP’T OF JUST.
OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., Audit of the U.S. Marshals Service Judicial Security Activities,
ii (June 2021), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/21-083_0.pdf.
144. Email from Emile Katz to Office of General Counsel, Dep’t. of Just., U.S.
Marshals Service (Dec. 11, 2020) (on file with author).
145. Letter from the Dep’t. of Just., U.S. Marshals Serv., Off. of Gen. Couns. to
Emile Katz (Mar. 8, 2021) (on file with author).
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contempt following their refusal to obey judicial orders.146 The court
had asked that deputy marshals be vaccinated against the COVID-19
virus before entering the courtroom, but the Marshals Service advised
deputy marshals that they didn’t need to respond to requests by
judges for proof of vaccination, nor answer questions about their
vaccination status.147 Judge Kornmann directed a USMS employee to
leave his courtroom during a hearing after the employee failed to
answer whether he was vaccinated.148 Later that day, the Marshals
Service left the building altogether and took various federal prisoners
with them, contrary to the judge’s orders, thereby “preventing timely
scheduling as previously ordered.”149 When Judge Kornmann
inquired who ordered the removal of the prisoners, the deputy
marshal answered that it was simply the Marshals’ Service.150
Separately, tension has also recently arisen between Congressional
directives to the marshals and control over the marshals by the
judicial branch; Congress has asked the marshals to disclose
information related to the activities of the judicial branch.151
146. See Ord. for United States v. Kilgallon, et al., No. 1:21-CR-10023 (01), (02)
AND (03)-CBK, 1-2 (D.S.D. June 29, 2021) (“The Department of Justice, acting through
the Marshals Service, has apparently adopted a public policy to the effect that DOJ
policies may trump lawful federal court orders . . . . I cannot ignore what may be a
significant conflict between the Federal Judiciary and the Executive branch of our
government.”); Criminal Charges Filed Against U.S. Marshal Supervisors in Vaccine
Dispute, Defender Services Office Training Division, FD.ORG (June 15, 2021),
https://www.fd.org/news/criminal-charges-filed-against-us-marshal-supervisorsvaccine-dispute; see also Josh Blackman, Update from South Dakota: Judge Kornmann
Appoints Special Prosecutor to Try U.S. Marshals for Contempt, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY,
(June 30, 2021), https://reason.com/volokh/2021/06/30/update-from-southdakota-judge-kornmann-appoints-special-prosecutor-to-try-u-s-marshalls-forcontempt/.
147. See In re Kilgallon, No. 1:21-MC-01, 2021 WL 2102650, at *3 (D.S.D. May
19, 2021); see also Arielle Zionts, SD Federal Judge Wants to Hold U.S. Marshals Service
in Contempt Over COVID-19 Vaccine Spat, RAPID CITY J. (June 29, 2021),
https://rapidcityjournal.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/sd-federal-judgewants-to-hold-u-s-marshals-service-in-contempt-over-covid-19/article_215e0c11a9d2-5ec3-b106-ad7d92c691e3.html.
148. Ord. for United States v. Kilgallon, et al., No. 1:2I1-CR-10023 (01), (02) AND
(03)-CBK, 3 (D.S.D. June 29, 2021).
149. Id.
150. See In re Kilgallon, 540 F. Supp. 3d 875, 879 (D.S.D., 2021) (“[The Chief
Deputy Marshal of South Dakota] did not answer the question of the court as to who
made the decision to leave with the prisoners. It was simply the Marshals Service. I
assume that an official in the Washington, D.C. office authorized and perhaps directed
the action which may very well be subject to contempt sanctions.”).
151. Senators Sheldon Whitehouse and John Kennedy recently directed a
request to the U.S. Marshals Service “to provide information about where Supreme
Court justices have traveled.” See John Fritze, Senators Ask Marshals Service for
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In short, although the department of justice has attained more
control over the marshals throughout their history, the marshals have
historically been independent of the executive branch and largely
subordinate to the judiciary. Even under their contemporary
organization, the marshals remain at the beck of the courts. Keeping
this history in mind will help us assess the constitutionality of the
marshals.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IMPLICATED IN DELEGATING EXECUTIVE
AUTHORITY TO THE JUDICIARY

In Cunningham, the Supreme Court said that marshals are
executive officials, so we will assume—for now—that they are.
Because the marshals are subordinate, at least in part, to the judicial
branch, the statute authorizing that structure may violate the
separation of powers. Article II, § 1 of the Constitution begins with
the phrase “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.”152 Article II, § 3 says that the President
“shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”153 These clauses
have been interpreted by some to mean that only the executive
branch, with the President at its head, is constitutionally empowered
to enforce the laws.154 Because marshals enforce court orders as well
as directives given to them by the executive branch, the statute may
violate the separation of powers principle inherent in these clauses.155
The marshals allow the federal courts to mix the executive and
judicial powers. As described above, Mishra explains that the Vesting
and Take Care Clauses limit the Executive’s ability to delegate to
private non-governmental actors, such as when the Bureau of Prisons
delegates the power to punish or discipline to private prisons.156 If
Information on Past Supreme Court Justice Travel, USA TODAY (June 8, 2021, 8:05 AM)
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/06/08/senators-seekinsight-into-when-where-supreme-court-justices-travel/7593347002/.
Although
this request merely asks for information, it demonstrates Congress’s understanding
that it also has control of the marshals, thereby adding a twist to who the marshals
must ultimately answer to. If the Court directs the marshals Service not to answer
the request, must the marshals still do so? What if the Attorney General directs them
to answer?
152. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
153. Id. § 3.
154. See id.; Laufer v. Arpan LLC, 29 F.4th 1268, 1294–95 (Newsom, J.,
concurring).
155. See Part II, supra note 152, at II.
156. See Mishra, supra note 21, at 1546–47.

29

2022 GRAND UNIFIED (SEPARATION OF POWERS) THEORY

351

the structure of the office of the marshals is a delegation to the
judiciary it has more dangerous ramifications. When the executive or
legislative branch delegates to private entities they generally only
delegate one aspect of the government’s power (e.g., legislative,
executive, judicial).157 However, when the legislative branch
delegates a coordinate branch’s authority to another coordinate
branch, the government’s powers are concentrated.158 With control
of the marshals, the judiciary exercises both the judicial and executive
functions: an arguably tyrannical result.159
“The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of
separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of
Government.”160 It stands to reason that, just as the Court has held
that “‘the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
ordained by the Constitution mandates that Congress generally
cannot delegate its legislative power to another [b]ranch,” the
Constitution also prohibits Congress from delegating the power of the
executive branch to the judicial branch.161
Indeed, a delegation of executive authority from the legislative to
the judicial branch may be even more egregious because the power is
not the legislature’s to delegate in the first place.162 Even if Congress
could, constitutionally, broadly delegate legislative power, Congress
is still prohibited from delegating executive power. The legislature
cannot give what it does not possess in the first place.163 Of course, if
Bradley’s article is correct, then perhaps the marshals are not purely
executive, and Congress can constitutionally delegate control over

157. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 18, at 1397, 1439 (describing different
delegations).
158. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY:
PROBLEMS, TEXTS, AND CASES 46 (8th ed. 2017).
159. The Federalist Papers: No. 47 (James Madison) (“The accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few,
or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).
160. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
161. Id. at 371–72 (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)).
162. See U.S. CONST. art. I & art. II.
163. I have not seen the common law legal maxim applied to constitutional law,
but I do not see why the concept of nemo dat quod non habet should not apply to
political rights as well as other rights. Legal Maxims, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019) (“No one gives what he does not have; no one transfers [a right] that he does
not possess.”). See generally Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 42–43 (1825) (Justice
Marshall’s opinion implies the same idea when he states that Congress may delegate
powers “which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself.” (emphasis added)).
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them.164 Alternatively, the legislature can try to constitutionally
facilitate the beneficial delegation of authority from one branch to
another through legislation at the request of the branch with the
delegated authority. However, the same nondelegation principle may
generally prohibit the executive branch from delegating its executive
authority to the judicial branch as well.165
Assuming that marshals are executive, several doctrinal
frameworks can be employed analogically to determine whether the
statutes under which they are organized violate the separation of
powers by giving the courts executive power.
A.

Analyzing the Marshals Under Theories Involving Executive
Control of the Administrative State

As explained above, there is no consensus on the scope of the
President’s directive authority under the Constitution.166 Proponents
of unitary executive theory argue that all actions to enforce the laws
of the United States must ultimately come under the control of the
President.167 Therefore, when analyzing the marshals, a unitary
executive proponent may ask whether the structure of the marshals
removes some control over law enforcement from the President. That
said, the traditional view is that if Congress assigns policy decisions
elsewhere, the President cannot direct that decision.168 Because the
Court has not addressed this issue directly it is unclear what standard
applies. The closest case to controlling precedent is Bowsher v. Synar,
where “the Court held the Comptroller General could not lawfully
exercise executive powers assigned to him by statute”169 because the
Comptroller General was subordinate to the legislature rather than
the Executive.170 We might, therefore, infer that a court would apply
similar reasoning to the courts’ control over the marshals. But, unlike
in Bowsher where Congress could remove the Comptroller,171 only the

164. See Bradley, supra note 88, at 804.
165. See generally Mishra, supra note 21 (analyzing limits on the executive’s
ability to delegate).
166. See supra Part I.A.
167. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 35, at 1166.
168. See BREYER ET AL., supra note 24, at 149.
169. Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1792 (2020) (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 732–35 (1986)) (Thomas, J., concurrence).
170. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727–28, 732–33.
171. See id. at 734.
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President can remove marshals.172 Despite that difference, the same
concern remains, namely, that a branch other than the executive can
direct executive powers.173
The caveat to this analysis is the possibility that the marshals are
not “executive” officials. If a court were to find that the authority to
direct marshals is within the inherent judicial power,174 and that
marshals are not therefore agents of the executive branch, it would be
constitutionally unnecessary for the President to maintain directive
authority over the marshals. In that scenario, the court could find that
any law enforcement function undertaken by the marshals was
merely incidental to the marshals’ traditional duties assisting the
courts. But, given the Supreme Court’s precedent indicating that
marshals are executive,175 that seems unlikely.
This Article does not focus heavily on appointment and removal
because marshals have historically been appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate and have been removable
by the President at will.176 The logistic difficulty of removing a
marshal is relevant to the analysis here since, as Kagan notes,177 a
President’s ability to threaten removal is equivalent to directive
authority. If a President can believably threaten removal upon
dissatisfaction with a marshal’s conduct, marshals will likely follow
the President’s direction. Thus, the President’s removal authority
bolsters the President’s power to direct the marshals.
B. Analyzing the Marshals Under the Nondelegation Doctrine
The standard that the Court uses to determine whether a
delegation violates the separation of powers is the “intelligible
principle” test.178 The crux of the test is that the delegating law must
172. See 28 U.S.C. § 561(d); Judiciary Act of 1789.
173. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 736 (“[T]he powers vested in the Comptroller
General . . . violate the command of the Constitution that the Congress play no direct
role in the execution of the laws.”).
174. See supra Part I.D.
175. See id.
176. The Judiciary Act establishing the marshals did not specify which branch
would appoint and remove marshals. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 27; 28 U.S.C. § 561.
However, President Washington seemingly assumed he would make the
appointments. History: Recognition of the Need for Federal Marshals, U.S. Marshals
Serv., https://www.usmarshals.gov/history/judiciary/judiary_act_of_1789_6.htm
(last visited Feb. 14, 2022).
177. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2327–28.
178. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019).
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contain an “intelligible principle” providing the executive branch with
guidance on effectuating the law.179 Thus, one way to determine
whether the statute creating the marshals violates the non-delegation
doctrine is to see if it contains an intelligible principle guiding the
judiciary’s use of the marshals. In Schechter Poultry, the Court was
concerned with ensuring that the President was not exercising the
legislative power.180 Here, a court might concern itself with ensuring
that the judiciary does not have unfettered discretion to enforce
laws—i.e., exercise the executive power.
In this context, application of the intelligible raises the question
which branch must set out the intelligible principle, Congress or the
Executive. In legislative delegations, Congress must set out an
intelligible principle for the delegee to comply with. Here, however,
Congress delegated a power presumptively belonging to the executive
branch (instead of its own power), and thus it makes sense that the
executive would have to set out the intelligible principle.181 It is
unclear how exactly the executive branch could do so. Usually, the
intelligible principle must be incorporated in the statute itself.
Perhaps, since the executive takes part in the legislative process by
signing bills into law (or vetoing them),182 we can infer that when the
executive signs a bill, he, she, or they approve the intelligible principle
contained within it.183
That said, even if a bill does not contain a satisfactory intelligible
179. See J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“So long as Congress ‘shall lay down by
legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to
[exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not
a forbidden delegation of legislative power.’”) (citation omitted) (alteration in
original).
180. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537
(1935).
181. This idea tracks the principle underlying the nondelegation doctrine. The
basis for the traditional intelligible principle test is that it is ultimately Congress who
must exercise the Article I legislative power. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531
U.S. 457, 472–73 (2001). Agencies only fill in details pursuant to the intelligible
principle that Congress set out. See id. If executive power is delegated, it would not
help to maintain the separation of powers if Congress set out an intelligible principle
because by setting out its own intelligible principle, Congress would be exercising
executive power instead of the President. To ensure that the appropriate power is
being exercised by the appropriate branch, the appropriate branch must delineate the
clarifying intelligible principle to be followed. Logically, only the President should set
out an intelligible principle when executive power is delegated.
182. See U.S. CONST., art. I § 7.
183. See Implied Consent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Consent
inferred from one’s conduct rather than from one’s direct expression.”).
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principle on its face, when the power being delegated is executive, the
Executive should be able to set out an intelligible principle in other
ways, such as by executive order. If that’s accurate, a statute
delegating executive power would never be facially invalid unless it
specifically precluded the President from issuing clarifying
instructions to executive officers. That’s because it’s more important
to assess whether marshals are ultimately under the control of the
Executive—who can set out an intelligible principle later—rather than
whether Congress, which wrote the statute, included an intelligible
principle. Therefore, in analyzing a delegation like this, it’s necessary
to look both at the text of the statute and at subsequent history to
determine whether an intelligible principle exists and if so, who
created it.
Even if the executive branch does somehow set out an intelligible
principle for the marshals, the type of delegation here may be “so
fundamental” to the executive branch’s law enforcement duty “as not
to be transferable.” If so, under both Verkuil’s and Mishra’s analysis,
judicial control over the marshals would be unconstitutional.
Whether or not marshals serve a “fundamental” executive function is
elaborated on below.
Because of the difficulty in applying the intelligible principle test
in this context, we can question whether it is a coherent test to begin
with. And, even if it can be applied, given the current composition of
the Court, the intelligible principle test may not remain good law for
very long.184
C. Analyzing the Marshals Under the Administrative Adjudication
Doctrine
Another method of determining whether the statute which
created the marshals impermissibly delegates is by analogizing to
statutes which delegate judicial power. The Supreme Court has held
that the judiciary’s “essential attributes” must be reserved for Article
III courts. That “essential attributes” concept can be applied to the
marshals as well.
Under Supreme Court precedent, the “essential attributes” test
has essentially meant that non-Article III courts can make
determinations of fact, so long as determinations of law are left with

184. See supra Part I.A. (noting the opinions of several current justices who have
opposed the current application of the nondelegation doctrine).
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the Article III judiciary.185 After all, “[i]t is emphatically the province
and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.”186
Analogizing to the structure of the marshals, the courts may
direct marshals so long as the ultimate responsibility of “tak[ing] Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed”187 remains vested with the
executive branch. This test practically echoes the doctrine concerning
executive control over the administrative state.188 Both focus on
whether one branch is exercising the “essential attributes” of
another.189 In the case of the judiciary it is whether another court is
exercising traditional judicial powers190 and in the case of the
executive it is whether another branch is executing the law.191 Thus,
this Article will use both tests synonymously when analyzing the
various iterations of the marshals below.
As related above, the organizational structure of the marshals has
changed over time pursuant to statute and practice.192 This Article
analyzes the separation of powers concerns of the statutory schemes
under which the marshals were organized in 1789 and the present
statutory scheme separately.
V.

APPLYING THE FRAMEWORKS TO SPECIFIC
ITERATIONS OF THE MARSHALS

A. Marshals Under the 1789 Judiciary Act
As described above, the 1789 Judiciary Act gave the federal
courts a great deal of control over the marshals, significantly more
control than courts exercise over the marshals today. So, the
organization of the marshals in 1789 posed a far greater danger to the
separation of powers than today’s organization.193
185. This is a generalization of a complicated doctrine but can serve as a
foundation here. See generally Crowell v. Crowell, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932); Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986); Stern v. Marshall, 564
U.S. 462, 515 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
186. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
187. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3.
188. See supra Part III.A.
189. Compare Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) with Marbury, 5 U.S.
at 177.
190. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51–54.
191. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 736.
192. See supra Part II.
193. See supra Part III.
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It is noteworthy, then, that the marshals’ organization was
enacted by many of the Founders who framed the Constitution and
who presumably understood their own intentions in creating the
separation of powers.194 The Court has presumed constitutionality
when a practice has a long history195 and relying on historical practice
is a common feature in separation of powers analyses.196 Thus, even
though the statute creating the marshals may infringe on the
separation of powers based on some of the frameworks below, a court
might rely on their long history to find the marshals constitutional.197
That said, we test the marshals’ constitutionality below by applying
the various separation of powers tests.
1.

Applying the Intelligible Principle Test

Beginning with the text of the Judiciary Act, it is possible to argue
both for and against the existence of an intelligible principle. To
support the existence of an intelligible principle, one can point to the
statutory phrase “execute throughout the district, all lawful precepts

194. For example, James Madison was an important framer of the Constitution
as well as an influential member of the House of Representatives. See Irving Bryant,
James Madison: President of the United States, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (last visited Feb. 14,
2022), https://www.britannica.com/biography/James-Madison.
195. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 327–28 (1936)
(the Court declined to invalidate a congressional delegation of foreign affairs
authority to the President, because “[a] legislative practice such as we have here,
evidenced not by only occasional instances, but marked by the movement of a steady
stream for a century and a half of time, goes a long way in the direction of proving the
presence of unassailable ground for the constitutionality of the practice, to be found
in the origin and history of the power involved, or in its nature, or in both combined.”).
See also Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, where the Court stated that actions taken by
the first Congress were presumptively constitutional. 572 U.S. 565, 602 (2014) (Alito,
J., and Scalia, J., concurring) (“This Court has often noted that actions taken by the
First Congress are presumptively consistent with the Bill of Rights”). Yet, note that
there are examples of the early Congress passing legislation which was found to
unconstitutionally infringe on the separation of powers. See, e.g., Hayburn’s Case, 2
U.S.
408
(1792);
see
also
Hayburn’s
Case,
OXFORD
REFERENCE,
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.201108030959254
55 (last visited Jan. 29, 2022) (five of the six justices of the Supreme Court, while
sitting as circuit judges in different circuits, held that a congressional delegation of
certain nonjudicial duties to the federal courts violated the separation of powers).
196. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the
Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411–13 (2012); Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 401 (1989) (“‘traditional ways of conducting government . . . give meaning’
to the Constitution.”(citation omitted)); see also Parillo, supra note 12, at 1311 (using
evidence of early congressional practice to prove constitutionality).
197. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371.
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. . . issued under the authority of the United States.”198 Breaking it
down to its components, a court could find that the Act provides an
intelligible principle because it requires the Courts to use the
marshals in a certain way and therefore limits the courts’ discretion.
The Act sets restrictions by only allowing the courts to use marshals
to (a) execute lawful precepts which (b) are issued under the
authority of the United States. The Court has allowed broad
intelligible principles in the past199 and so it is feasible the Court
would find an intelligible principle here.
But it is also easy to argue that there is no intelligible principle.
In Schechter Poultry the Court held that a delegation which gave the
President nearly unfettered discretion to enact laws violated the
nondelegation doctrine.200 Analogous to the unfettered discretion
referred to in Schechter Poultry, the Judiciary Act gave judges nearly
unfettered discretion to direct marshals. The authors of the Judiciary
Act gave courts the power to issue orders at their discretion201 and
thus the first limit—lawful precepts—referred to above is no limit at
all.202 As all Article III courts act under the authority of the United
198. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 27 (emphasis added).
199. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (statute
instructing the EPA Administrator to set air quality standards “the attainment and
maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on [the] criteria
[documents of § 108] and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to
protect the public health” (emphasis added, internal quotation omitted) (alteration
in original)); Gundy v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2116, 2132 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (“The breadth of the authority Congress granted to the Attorney General
in these few words can only be described as vast.”); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in
the Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 581 (2000) (“Virtually any delegation to
an agency, no matter how vague, will survive constitutional scrutiny.”).
200. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537–38
(1935).
201. The Judiciary Act of 1789 contained the precursor to the modern All Writs
Act. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14 (1789) (“That all the before-mentioned courts of the
United States, shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all
other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the
exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages
of law.” (emphasis added)). Additionally, the Judiciary Act mentions the courts’
authority to issue orders (and specifically to the marshals) in numerous sections. See
id. §§ 6, 7, 15, 17, 29.
202. The Supreme Court has held that “[u]nless appropriately confined by
Congress, a federal court may avail itself of all auxiliary writs as aids in the
performance of its duties, when the use of such historic aids is calculated in its sound
judgment to achieve the ends of justice entrusted to it.” United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co.,
434 U.S. 159, 173 (1977) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S.
269, 273 (1942) (internal quotation omitted)); but see Shoop v. Twyford, 142 S.Ct.
2037, 2042 (2022) (All Writs Act can only be used in aid of court’s jurisdiction).
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States,203 the second limit is illusory as well. Thus, the only sentence
in the Act which could feasibly provide a limit on the ability of the
courts to direct the marshals does not actually constrain the courts in
any meaningful way. The Act allowed the courts to direct the
marshals as the courts saw fit.
As explained above, this Article proposes that a delegation’s
intelligible principle must derive from the branch whose power is
being delegated.204 President Washington signed the Judiciary Act
into law on September 24, 1789 so it is clear that he approved of
creating marshals. But Washington’s signature does not create an
intelligible principle for the courts to follow. Washington could have
provided further principles to guide the use of the marshals, but the
only record in his papers that mentions the marshals does not do
so.205 That record is a proclamation pertaining to the Whiskey
Rebellion and notes that normal judicial procedure and use of force
by Marshal David Lenox failed to put down the rebellion.206
Washington provided no further intelligible principle beyond the Act.
On balance, it doesn’t seem like any intelligible principle truly
animated the statutory authority for the court’s control over the
marshals. But given the malleability of the intelligible principle test,
there’s no way to tell for certain how a court would decide.
2. Applying the “Essential Attributes” Test
Next, the “essential attributes” test. Based on the text of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, one might conclude that ultimate responsibility
for the marshals traced to the President because marshals were
removable at pleasure.207 The text also states that the marshals
execute “all lawful precepts directed to [them], and issued under the
203. See U.S. CONST., art. III §§ 1, 2.
204. See supra Part III.B.
205. George Washington: A Proclamation (Aug. 7, 1794), reprinted in 16 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, 1 May–30 September 1794, 531–37
(David R. Hoth & Carol S. Ebel eds. 2011).
206. See id.
207. See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 27, (“[B]ut [marshals] shall be removable from
office at pleasure.”). The statute does not actually set out who the marshals can be
removed by, but we can infer that it is the President because later the section specifies
that deputy marshals may be removed “from office by the judge of the district court,
or the circuit court sitting within the district, at the pleasure of either.” Id. If the
marshals themselves were removable by the courts, the section would have said so.
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 107
(2012) (“The expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others).
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authority of the United States”208 and the President can be considered
an “authority of the United States.” But, as discussed above, for most
of their history, marshals were largely independent of any centralized
executive control.209 There are few records of a President removing a
marshal.210 Even if a President wanted to give direction to a marshal
or remove them, in the era before modern technology, it could take
weeks before the marshal received that direction.211 As a practical
matter the President did not have nearly the level of control over the
marshals as district court judges had.212 And as explained, the central
government only attained even nominal control over the marshals in
the mid-1800s.213 So, it doesn’t seem as if the executive branch
retained the “essential attribute” of enforcement.
We must also consider whether the marshals must be
categorized as exclusively Executive. If not, judicial direction of the
marshals would not violate the “essential attributes” test. There is a
close link between the historic role of the sheriff and that of the
courts.214 Even so, the historic connection between the sheriff and the
court is not dispositive given that the courts themselves were part of
the executive branch under the English system of government and
208. Id.
209. See supra Part II.
210. A marshal was removed by the President on October 15, 1903. See
Removed by the President.; United States Marshal Fieid of Vermont Allowed Chinese to
Escape, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1903, at 6. See generally Martin v. Tobin, 451 F.2d 1335
(9th Cir. 1971) (President Nixon removed a marshal and the marshal brought
declaratory judgment action to determine the propriety of his discharge); Chabal v.
Regan, 633 F. Supp. 1061 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (marshal sued for reinstatement after being
removed by the Regan administration).
211. A trotting horse moves at an average speed of 8.1 miles per hour. See SUSAN
E. HARRIS, HORSE GAITS, BALANCE AND MOVEMENT 35–37 (Howell Book House 1993). If the
President wanted to send a message to an U.S. Marshal in Texas from Washington,
D.C., an approximate distance of 1550 miles, it would likely take over twenty-one days
to arrive (1549 miles divided by 8.1 miles per hour divided by an assumed nine hours
of riding per day). The telegraph was not initially an option for sending messages
since it was only invented in 1837. See Clare D. McGillem, Telegraph, ENCYC.
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/technology/telegraph (last visited Feb. 14,
2022). Texas did not have a telegraph office until 1854. See Curtis Bishop & L. R.
Wilcox, Telegraph Service, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE, TEXAS STATE HIST. ASS’N
https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/telegraph-service (July 6, 2017). To
be fair, this is not so much a structural problem with the marshals but, rather, was
simply the reality of the time and would have been true even if courts had no control
over the marshals.
212. See supra Part II.
213. See id.
214. See id. (explaining that the idea of creating the marshals was inspired by
the traditional role of sheriff).
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Americans adopted a tripartite system of government.215 But
marshals can also be viewed as general assistants to the federal
government⎯irrespective of branch.216 Support for this can be found
in the fact that marshals were early tasked with conducting the
national census as well as collecting certain government revenues⎯
tasks which are not exactly law enforcement.217 In Wayman, the Court
stated that “Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which
the legislature may rightfully exercise itself” even if those powers are
not exclusively legislative.218 Thus, if marshals are characterized as
general government assistants rather than law enforcement officers,
it would not violate the “essential attributes” test for the courts to
exercise significant discretion over their use. By contrast, if the
marshals are purely executive, the structure of the marshals under the
Judiciary Act would have failed the essential attributes test. District
courts had directive control over the marshals, they had removal
power over the deputy marshals, and the President had no quick way
to direct the marshals in practice.
Perhaps, the test most likely to have preserved the structure of
the marshals is the one proposed by Dina Mishra.219 To some extent
Mishra’s test is a more lenient version of the essential attributes test
described above. It seeks to ensure that the executive is the final
arbiter in law enforcement matters while allowing other actors to act
in the interim.220 Mishra’s analysis first asks whether the power is
executive and then whether the authority exercising the power
answers sufficiently to the executive branch.221 Marshals carry out
law enforcement tasks, so their power is at last arguably executive.
Yet the judiciary is not subordinate to the President. Even so, the
President “retains some ability to take meaningful steps to encourage
the faithful execution of law”222 since he, she, or they could still bypass
the judiciary and direct or fire the marshals. Mishra’s suggested
analysis is more concerned with ultimate authority rather than
control of day-to-day functions.223 Therefore, the original structure of
215. See Katz, supra note 102, at 1925.
216. See CALHOUN, supra note 96, at 3.
217. See id.
218. 23 U.S. 1, 42.
219. See Mishra, supra note 21, at 1541.
220. Compare N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 81
(1982), with Mishra, supra note 21, at 1524.
221. See Mishra, supra note 21, at 1524.
222. Id. at 1541.
223. See id. at 1541–42.
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the marshals was likely constitutional under Mishra’s analysis.
In sum, whether or not one views the original marshals’
organizational structure as constitutional or not depends largely on
how the marshals are themselves characterized. Each of the Court’s
separation of powers tests can be applied analogically to the marshal’s
original structure, but their malleability demonstrates how the tests
are only as good as our inputs. If we assume the 1789 marshals’
constitutionality⎯because they were established by the same
Founders who drafted the Constitution–it leads us to one of two
conclusions: the marshals must either (1) not have been considered
exclusively executive officers, or (2) the Founders must not have been
as concerned with delegation as some modern scholars believe.
B.

U.S. Marshals Under the Current Statutory Regime

The United States courts retain a great deal of control over
marshals even under the current statutory scheme; Marshals remain
tasked with carrying out the orders of, and assisting, the courts.224
And, the Judiciary Act of 1789, while modified by other statutes, has
never been completely repealed.
1.

Applying the Intelligible Principle Test

Similar to the original statute which created the marshals in
1789, the modern statute may contain an intelligible principle—or
not. Title 28 U.S.C. § 566 requires marshals “to obey, execute, and
enforce all orders of the United States District Courts, the United
States Courts of Appeals . . . “ etc.225 The last few words of § 566(a)
state that marshals are to act “as provided by law.”226 It is hard to see
what limits § 566 places on the judicial branch’s control over the
marshals. The authority granted to the courts to order the marshals
may somehow be tempered by the phrase “as provided by law,” but,
frankly, that doesn’t provide any real direction.227 If a judge wants to
push her authority to the limit, there is very little to stop her because
she will be protected by judicial immunity.228
224.
225.
226.
227.
orders.
228.

28 U.S.C. § 566(a).
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 566(a).
Presumably, the courts are only limited by their inability to issue unlawful
See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12–13 (1991) (holding that a judge was
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Furthermore, unlike the 1789 Act, the modern statute specifies
that marshals must execute “all orders” of the courts rather than “all
lawful precepts . . . issued under the authority of the United States.”229
We can infer from the change in language that the modern statute
places the marshals more exclusively under the control of the courts
than the original statute. Thus, the statute grants courts broad power
to command the marshals—raising the specter of delegation without
any limiting intelligible principle.
As explained above, the statute’s text is not the only way to set
out an intelligible principle when the Executive’s power is delegated.
We can also look to other means by which the executive branch
directs the marshals. For instance, other sections of Title 28 reveal
more centralized control over the marshals by the executive
branch,230 and § 566 should not be read in isolation.231 Those sections
of the statute allow the executive branch to provide an intelligible
principle for the marshals during their duties. The executive branch
issues directions to the marshals and their deputies as well as pays for
expenses and fills vacancies.232 Additionally, the “United States
Marshals Service retains final authority regarding security
requirements for the judicial branch of the Federal Government.”233

immune from suit after the judge issued a bench warrant for a lawyer’s arrest, and
instructing the police sent to arrest him to “rough him up a little” resulting in the
lawyer being beaten).
229. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 27; 28 U.S.C. § 566(c) (stating that the “Service shall
execute all lawful writs, process, and orders issued under the authority of the United
States” but the modern reference to writs and process makes clear that the statute is
referring to authority of the courts).
230. See 28 U.S.C. § 561(a) (creating the United States Marshals Service with a
Director who “is authorized to appoint and fix the compensation of such employees
as are necessary to carry out the powers and duties of the Service and may designate
such employees as law enforcement officers in accordance with such policies and
procedures as the Director shall establish”); 28 U.S.C. § 561(f) (“The Director shall
supervise and direct the United States Marshals Service in the performance of its
duties”); 28 U.S.C. § 562 (“In the case of a vacancy in the office of a United States
marshal, the Attorney General may designate a person to perform the functions of
and act as marshal”); 28 U.S.C. § 565 (“The Director is authorized to use funds
appropriated for the Service to make payments for expenses incurred pursuant to
personal services contracts and cooperative agreements, authorized by the Attorney
General, for security guards and for the service of summons on complaints,
subpoenas, and notices in lieu of services by United States marshals and deputy
marshals.”).
231. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 534–35 (2015); NLRB v. SW
Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 938–39 (2017).
232. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 561, 562, 565.
233. Id. § 566(i).
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That the Service has final authority over security requirements for the
courts might reflect the marshals’ ultimate independence from the
courts. Nonetheless, that provision may be of limited significance
given that the courts maintain the power to require the local marshal’s
attendance during court sessions.234 Even more importantly, the
statute makes clear that it is the “primary role and mission” of the
marshals to obey the courts.235
Since the intelligible principle test is practically useless in
ascertaining whether a non-legislative delegation is in fact
unconstitutional, we next apply the essential attributes test. Even if
the “essential attributes” test is also manipulable, evident by the
court’s varied decisions on non-Article III adjudication, it is more
transparent in trying to balance the needs of modern government
against the desire to protect the constitutional structure. In J.W.
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, Chief Justice Taft,236 writing for the
Court, explained the Court’s approach to cooperative ventures: “In
determining what [Congress] may do in seeking assistance from
another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be
fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the
government co-ordination.”237
The “essential attributes” test
provides a structure that can accurately be described as “inherent to
the necessities of government co-ordination.”
2. Applying the “Essential Attributes” Test
The modern era provides the executive branch far greater
practical control over the marshals than previously available. This
results from a revised statutory scheme as well as the development of
modern technology which allows the central government to direct
marshals promptly. Yet, as described above, the statute also clarifies
the central role of the marshals: assisting the judiciary.238
Unlike earlier eras, communication is now virtually
234. See id. § 566(b).
235. Id. § 566(a).
236. Note that Chief Justice Taft’s opinion on this matter is especially
informative given that he served both as the twenty-seventh President of the United
States and the tenth Chief Justice of the United States. Consequently, Taft had
experience with both judicial and executive functions. See William Howard Taft, The
White
House,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-whitehouse/presidents/william-howard-taft/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2022).
237. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
238. See 28 U.S.C. § 566(a).
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instantaneous. Therefore, if the executive branch disagrees with a
marshals’ actions, they can notify the marshal quickly and, if the
marshal refuses to change course, the President can remove the
marshal. This has occurred. In one instance a marshal “was dismissed
because he communicated to his superiors his belief that he was
bound to follow the instructions and orders of the Federal Judges of
the Middle District and that the Justice Department and the United
States Bureau of Prisons were interfering with such instructions and
orders.”239 The district court held that the statute under which the
marshals are organized allows the President to remove a marshal
without cause, even where the marshal is actively working on the
behalf of the judicial branch.240 The court expressly refused to reach
whether Congress could make the marshals independent of the
executive branch,241 and the decision was subsequently vacated on
other grounds,242 but it nevertheless bolsters the notion that the
modern structure of the marshals hews more closely to presidential
directives. Furthermore, as discussed above, there have been
contemporary instances in which deputy marshals have disobeyed
judicial orders at the direction of the Marshals Service.243 Those
instances demonstrate that under current practices, the executive
branch retains greater authority to direct marshals.
Additionally, the executive branch is statutorily authorized to
use, and does use, marshals for law enforcement purposes.244 Finally,
the statute organizing the marshals states that the director of the
marshals “shall supervise and direct the United States Marshals
Service in the performance of its duties.”245 Although the Marshals
Service is different from the marshals themselves, the service
provides critical support (like payment) that marshals need to
function.246
239. See Chabal v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1061, 1063 (M.D. Pa. 1986), vacated, 822
F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1987).
240. See id. at 1064–65 (“While the Marshal’s Service may frequently serve two
houses, it has but one master”). Despite this decision, I believe that the issues outlined
by the GAO report discussed in Part II supra contradict that assertion.
241. See id. at 1065 n.3 (“[W]e do not reach the question of whether the statute
would be a legitimate constitutional exercise of congressional power were § 561 so
intended.”).
242. See Chabal v. Regan, 822 F.2d 349, 358 (3d Cir. 1987).
243. See Ord. for United States v. Kilgallon, et al., No. 1:21-CR-10023 (01), (02)
AND (03)-CBK, 3 (D.S.D. June 29, 2021).
244. See 28 U.S.C. § 561(f).
245. Id. § 561(g).
246. See id. §§ 565–566.
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Be that as it may, § 566 clarifies that the primary role and mission
of the marshals is to obey the courts.247 And marshal employees have
been held in contempt of court when they have disobeyed judicial
commands.248 Thus, marshals might be unable to ignore court orders
at the behest of the executive branch without facing penal
consequences. The court’s power to order marshals to do their
bidding may undermine the “essential attributes” of the Executive’s
law enforcement function.
* * *
Unitary executive theory, the nondelegation doctrine, and the
essential attributes test all provide guidance for assessing the
marshals’ constitutionality. The directive structure of the marshals
clearly raises separation of powers concerns. But, as shown above,
the history of the marshals, the text of the organizing statutes, and the
malleability of the various doctrines could allow courts to reach
opposing results when assessing the marshals’ constitutionality.
VI.

FUNCTIONAL AND POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE U.S. MARSHALS

There are functional and policy reasons why the structure of the
marshals should be found constitutional. This Article explains some
of those justifications below, but disavows any reliance on policy in
constitutional interpretation.
First, the judicial branch arguably needs control over the
marshals to enforce its judgments. This justification assumes that
without plenary control, the judiciary cannot exercise its assigned
function under the Constitution. Relatedly, one justification for the
nondelegation doctrine is that it protects the system as a whole, not
the power of an individual branch.249 Allowing the courts to share
control over the marshals may infringe on some executive power but
ultimately redounds to the benefit of the system as a whole; If the
courts do not have an enforcement power, it is possible that the
executive branch could ignore the orders of the judiciary thereby
causing a constitutional crisis.250
247. See id. § 566(a).
248. See generally United States v. Kilgallon, 540 F. Supp. 3d 875 (D.S.D. 2021).
249. See Martin H. Redish, Pragmatic Formalism, Separation of Powers, and the
Need to Revisit the Nondelegation Doctrine, 51 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 363, 385 (2019).
250. See Edwin A. Miles, After John Marshall's Decision: Worcester v. Georgia and
the Nullification Crisis, 39 J. OF S. HIST. 519–20 (1973); see also Ameron, Inc. v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 787 F.2d 875, 889 (3d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he record shows that
upon the President’s orders, the Attorney General instructed all executive agencies to
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At least one Justice has provided a response to that argument.
Justice O’Connor writing for the Supreme Court in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey wrote:
As Americans of each succeeding generation are
rightly told, the Court cannot buy support for its
decisions by spending money and, except to a minor
degree, it cannot independently coerce obedience to its
decrees. The Court’s power lies, rather, in its
legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that
shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary
as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and to
declare what it demands.251
Even before constitutional ratification, Alexander Hamilton
explained the Court’s role pointedly—“[The courts] may truly be said
to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the
efficacy of its judgments.”252 The fact that the courts do not have
plenary authority over a law enforcement agency is only hard to
reconcile when we forget the separation of powers in our tripartite
government. The courts can carry out their constitutionally assigned
duties because they are respected and assisted by the executive, not
because they control the marshals or because of any inherent
authority to enforce orders.253
Although writing about Article-III Standing Doctrine, the
majority and dissenting opinions in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
provide two perspectives addressing the concern that the executive

ignore” certain court decisions.); Steve Vladeck, What Would Happen If Trump Ignored
a Divided Supreme Court Ruling Against Him?, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/10/14/what-would-happen-iftrump-ignored-divided-supreme-court-ruling-against-him/;
Aaron
Blake,
Constitutional Crisis? What Happens If Trump Decides To Ignore a Judge’s Ruling, WASH.
POST
(Feb.
5,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2017/02/05/constitutional-crisis-what-happens-if-trump-decides-toignore-a-judge/.
251. 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (emphasis added).
252. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added). In 1788,
Hamilton defended the creation of a federal judiciary by asserting that it had no
capacity for force. Yet, incongruously, in 1789 (just one year later) Congress created
the marshals, thereby giving the judiciary that capacity.
253. For an analysis of whether the Court has inherent authority to punish, see
Katz, supra note 102.
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branch will not do its job enforcing the law. Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia stated that allowing Congress to confer standing for
certain broad causes of action would:
permit Congress to transfer from the President to the
courts the Chief Executive’s most important
constitutional duty, to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed,” Art. II, §3. It would enable the
courts, with the permission of Congress, “to assume a
position of authority over the governmental acts of
another and co-equal department[ “ ] and to become
“‘virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and
soundness of Executive action.’”254
Justice Scalia takes it as a given that it is improper for the
judiciary to second guess of the Executive’s actions.255 He posits that
it is not the judiciary’s concern whether or not the executive branch is
properly enforcing the law. Therefore, it seems reasonable to
presume that Justice Scalia would have taken great umbrage at the
idea of the judicial branch directing federal law enforcement officers
themselves rather than leave enforcement for the executive branch.
This argument does not satisfactorily address what the remedy
should be, if any, when the executive branch ignores a court order.
Justice Blackmun’s dissent offers a compelling response to Justice
Scalia in Lujan:
[T]he principal effect of foreclosing judicial
enforcement of such procedures is to transfer power
into the hands of the Executive at the expense—not of
the courts—but of Congress, from which that power
originates and emanates . . . In my view, it reflects an
unseemly solicitude for an expansion of power of the
Executive Branch.256
Justice Blackmun argued that courts must have broad authority
to adjudicate claims to make sure that the will of the people, through

254. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S 555, 577 (1992) (citing Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984)).
255. See id.
256. Id. at 602–05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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their elected representatives in Congress, is being carried out.257
Reasoning by analogy, one can infer that Justice Blackmun would have
viewed the existence of the marshals as a necessity to ensure that
judicial orders are carried out rather than ignored by the executive
branch. The view taken by Justice Scalia seems to say, “trust the
executive to do its job,” while the view taken by Justice Blackmun
seems to say, “courts must have the power to ensure the executive is
doing its job.” Which side one thinks is right likely depends on
whether one has more trust in the elected and accountable
executive258 or the life-tenured and politically insulated judiciary.259
Another functional concern related to nondelegation, originally
raised by Professor Paul Verkuil, is the prevention of conflicts of
interest.260 Verkuil suggests that one of the fundamental purposes of
the separation of powers is to avoid conflicts of interest in the
governmental process and he traces that reasoning to “the earliest
expressions of the rule of law in Anglo-American jurisprudence.”261
But under the paradigm presented by Justice O’Connor in Casey, if the
judiciary rules that the executive branch must take a certain action, it
is left up to the executive to determine whether to enforce the judicial
order against itself.262 This creates the very conflict of interest that
Verkuil asserts is meant to be ameliorated through the separation of
powers because it would violate the principle that “no man can be a
judge in his own cause.”263 If someone in the executive branch is
accused of a crime, other members of the executive branch cannot
necessarily be considered neutral adjudicators entrusted with
enforcing the law.264 The only way to preserve the legitimacy of the
257. Id.
258. See generally Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1741, 1742–43 (2009) (explaining that the executive may be less accountable for its
actions than is often stated).
259. See Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Supremacy, 58 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1459, 1463 (2017) (“Far too often, legislators and officials have a strong
incentive not to comply with the Constitution . . . those without political power have
nowhere to turn except the judiciary for the protection of their constitutional
rights.”). “[T]he federal judiciary is the . . . institution most insulated from political
pressures. Article III of the Constitution provides that federal court judges have life
tenure unless impeached and that their salary may not be decreased during their
terms of office.” Id. at 1466.
260. See Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law and the Idea of
Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 304–06 (1989).
261. Id. at 305.
262. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).
263. Verkuil, supra note 259, at 305.
264. See Bradley, supra note 86, at 801.
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government therefore is to allow an impartial adjudicator, an Article
III judge, to enforce the law.
Another justification explaining why the structure of the
marshals may not to violate the separation of powers is voter waiver.
One of the unique aspects of the legislation which created the
marshals is the fact that it has remained codified with only minor
changes since 1789. That the legislation has remained so robust can
be used as a proxy for the electorate’s acceptance of the structure of
the marshals. To borrow a phrase from Justice Breyer in Milner v.
Department of the Navy, after two centuries without a constitutional
crisis it may be preferable to “let sleeping legal dogs lie.”265
There are also policy reasons cautioning against the court’s
control over the marshals. One danger is a lack of political
accountability. Unlike traditional legislative delegation cases, where
power is being transferred from one political branch (the legislature)
to another political branch (the executive), in the case of the marshals,
the power is being transferred from a political branch to a politically
insulated one. Although that may have rule of law benefits, it can raise
serious concerns about accountability. Courts sometimes abuse their
authority and if they do so with the marshals it is extremely hard to
hold them accountable.266
VII.

IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER NON-LEGISLATIVE DELEGATIONS

The parallel doctrines discussed above analyzing the marshals all
serve similar functions: supporting the separation of powers by
preventing too dramatic a shift in power from one branch to
another—thus ensuring each branch is exercising its respective
power. This common underlying concern sheds light on the vesting
clauses of Articles I, II, and III despite the different doctrinal
frameworks used to apply each of them. All three vesting clauses have
a “similar form and function” and the “few differences that do exist
between the . . . Clauses are largely semantic or stylistic.”267 This begs
the question of what, if any, utility there is in having separate doctrinal

265. Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 593 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
266. The only way of removing an Article III judge is by impeachment and, while
judicial impeachments occur, they are rare. See generally Fed. Jud. Ctr, Impeachments
of Federal Judges, https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/impeachments-federaljudges.
267. Thomson, supra note 68, at 329.
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frameworks.268 Regardless of doctrinal particulars, in the marshals
context, like in the legislative delegation context or administrative
adjudication context, the task remains the same: determining whether
a seeming relocation of one branch’s function to another branch is
core,269 constitutional, and problematic on the one hand or peripheral
and ministerial on the other. Despite using different names such as
“intelligible principle” or “essential attributes” the Court may have
been applying one test all along under the guise of different names.270
In each case the Court has ultimately applied a balancing test to
determine whether the balance has shifted too far in favor of
convenience271 such that the power listed in one vesting clause is
being exercised by a branch other than the one listed to the exclusion
of its proper branch.272 If that is true, it would be helpful for the Court
to clarify that the doctrinal test is the same regardless of which vesting
clause the Court is analyzing. Explaining such a balancing test,
weighing convenience against aggrandizement273—aside from
268. Courts already sometimes use the same terminology in different tests.
Compare A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935)
(“The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential
legislative functions with which it is thus vested” (emphasis added)) with N. Pipeline
Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (Congress “impermissibly
removed most, if not all, of ‘the essential attributes of the judicial power’ from the Art.
III district court” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).
269. In Morrison v. Olson, the Court was concerned that the Act it was
interpreting removed from the President one of his “core” powers—the prosecutorial
power. 487 U.S. 654, 688, 708 (1988).
270. “What’s in a name?/That which we call a rose/By any other name would
smell as sweet.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 2.
271. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“the separationof-powers principle, and the nondelegation doctrine in particular, do not prevent
Congress from obtaining the assistance of its coordinate Branches.”); Crowell v.
Crowell, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932) (“To hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious
purpose of the legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert, and inexpensive
method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to
examination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to
that task.”); Id. at 88 (“[A] class of controversy which experience has shown can be
more effectively and expeditiously handled in the first instance by a special and
expert tribunal.”).
272. See Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432 (1953); N. Pipeline Constr.
Co., 458 U.S. at 58–59, 62 (“[d]eciding whether a matter has in any measure been
committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the
action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a
delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court
as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211
(1962) (internal quotation omitted)).
273. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (“The Framers regarded the
checks and balances that they had built into the tripartite Federal Government as a
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providing transparency—would also mitigate the concern Justice
Thomas’s expressed in Whitman, namely, that despite an intelligible
principle a delegation may go too far in giving away legislative
power.274 Consolidating the separation of powers doctrine into one
test could also prevent inconsistency in application.275
The
Constitution makes no mention of “intelligible principles” or
“essential attributes,” and a test that simply asks whether the power
in the vesting clause is being unduly exercised by an actor it was not
assigned to more closely conforms to the text276 and history277 of the
Constitution. The Court can allow branches to assist each other,278 so
long as the ultimate authority granted by each vesting clause remains
with its assigned branch.

self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch
at the expense of the other.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison)
(explaining the danger of one branch encroaching on the powers of another).
274. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001).
275. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 10, at 1731 (“[C]ase law conspicuously
lacks any suggestion that the delegation metaphor or the concomitant intelligible
principle test constrains congressional delegations to the judges rather than the
executive.”). They note that the Court has broadly allowed Congress to delegate the
power to create procedural rules to the Court. Id. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(granting the Supreme Court “the power to prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts
[(including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof)] and courts of appeals.”).
276. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, art. II, § 1, & art. III § 1 (vesting each branch of
government with its designated power).
277. In THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, James Madison rejected the idea that a document
like the Constitution can contain any formal separation of powers. Rather, Madison
suggested that the only way to stop the encroachment of one branch upon another is
to organize government so that the various branches fight each other for power. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition.”). Based on the fact that Madison assumed the various branches could
encroach on each other's powers, and that only ambition would serve as a check, we
might infer that he did not believe intentionally giving away power would violate the
vesting clauses. The one hard line that Madison does seem to advocate is that each
branch should retain the ability to check the ambitions of the others. Id. (“[T]he great
security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the
necessary constitutional means . . . to resist encroachments of the others.”). Thus,
each branch must retain its essential power to ensure that the branches can check
one another. This is supported by the historical research conducted by Julian Davis
Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley in their article Delegation at the Founding in which
they conclude that the Founders did not question legislative delegations generally so
long as the legislature did not permanently alienate “legislative power without right
of reversion or control.” 121 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 307 (2021).
278. See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (affirming that
branches can assist each other).
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